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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 30 1979 NUMBER 1
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. SOUTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATiVE PROCEDURE ACT
A. Introduction
A notable occurrence in South Carolina administrative law
is the enactment of the State Administrative Procedure Act (the
Act).' Initially approved by the General Assembly during the
1976 session,2 the statute was revised and completely reenacted
on June 13, 1977. The Act is largely patterned after the Revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act (Model State Act).,
The Act also parallels the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
(Federal Act),' which, because of its more extensive legislative
and case-law history, should provide guidance to officials and the
South Carolina Supreme Court in interpreting and applying simi-
lar provisions of the South Carolina Act.' A growing body of case
law that interprets the various state enactments of versions of the
Model State Act also can guide the courts and agencies in apply-
ing the Act.
While no meaningful written legislative history of the Act
and no statement of findings or purpose was incorporated into the
Act by the state legislature, the intent of the Act is clearly to
provide "reasonable uniformity of practice and fair procedural
methods for the benefit of all persons affected by state adminis-
trative action."7
1. No. 176, 1977 S.C. Acts 391 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-10 to -400 (Cum.
Supp. 1977)).
2. No. 671, 1976 S.C. Acts 1758 (repealed 1977).
3. No. 176, 1977 S.C. Acts 391 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-10 to -400 (Cum.
Supp. 1977)). Article m, § 2 of the 1977 Act repealed No. 671 of 1976.
4. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1958 version), reprinted in 13
UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 347.
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
6. As of this writing, the South Carolina Supreme Court has not applied the Act.
According to the South Carolina Attorney General's Office, questions concerning the Act
have arisen in several circuit court cases, but no appeal to the supreme court has yet
occurred.
7. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, MODEL STATE ACT.
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Like the Model State Act, the South Carolina statute em-
braces a number of fundamental principles of administrative pro-
cedure, including: (1) a requirement that each state agency, ex-
cept in emergencies, follow uniform rulemaking procedures that
give interested persons adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard before rules are promulgated; (2) provisions for advance
determination, by the respective agency, the court, or both, of the
validity or applicability of administrative rules to particular
cases; (3) assurance that in individual cases and administrative
adjudications fundamental fairness is accorded through notice,
and an opportunity to present evidence and to be protected by
the rules of evidence; (4) assurance that the agency official(s)
making the final decision in a contested case will be personally
familiar with the evidence; and (5) provision for appropriate judi-
cial review of administrative orders to correct any significant
administrative errors.'
B. Regulation-Making
Prior to the advent of the State Administrative Procedure
Act, South Carolina statutes required only that official rules and
regulations of state agencies adopted under general and perma-
nent law be certified for substance by the promulgating agency,
certified for form by the Code Commissioner, and filed in the
office of the Secretary of State.9 No uniform procedures governing
publication of proposed regulations, opportunity for public input,
or testing of the validity or applicability of regulations prior to
enforcement were in effect. The 1977 Act repeals the previous
procedure governing filing of regulations' and provides for uni-
form methods of regulation-making, filing and publication of reg-
ulations, and General Assembly review.
From the public's viewpoint, one of the most important pro-
visions of the Act is article I, section 14,11 which requires that
virtually every written agency pronouncement be made available
for public inspection. Each agency is required to adopt and make
available for public inspection: (1) an organization and opera-
tions description that tells the public how to obtain information
about the agency and how to request agency action on particular
8. See id.
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-210 (1976) (repealed by No. 176, art. III, § 2, 1977 S.C. Acts
391).
10. No. 176, art. III, § 2, 1977 S.C. Acts 391, 406.
11. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-23-140 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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matters; (2) a policy statement describing all formal and informal
procedures available before the agency, as well as all forms and
instructions 'used by the agency; and (3) all final orders of the
agency, unless otherwise provided by law. The section adds a
strong sanction against secretive agency action by providing that
no rule or decision is valid until made available for public inspec-
tion.
While these public information requirements closely parallel
those in the Model State Act 2 and the Federal Act,' 3 the South
Carolina Act is less stringent than these because it does not ex-
pressly require the descriptions of agency organization and proce-
dures in article I, sections 14(a)(1) and (a)(2)" to be adopted and
published as formal rules. The practical effect is to put on mem-
bers of the public the burden of seeking.this information from
state agencies. The Act serves to ensure, however, that the infor-
mation is freely available to those who inquire.
In a manner parallel to the publication and codification of
federal agency regulations, the Act provides in article I for the
publication of state agency documents in a State Register,'5 and
for the periodic collection of currently effective regulations in a
Code of State Regulations.'"
Knowledge of the definitions of terminology used in the Act
is necessary for a complete understanding of the regulation-
making scheme. The term "document" is defined as: "a regula-
tion, notice or similar instrument issued or promulgated pursuant
to law by a State agency."' The definition of "regulation" is:
"each agency statement of general public applicability that im-
plements or prescribes law or policy or practice requirements of
any agency."' 8 The scope of the two terms "document" and
12. See MODEL STATE Acr § 2. Section 14 of the 1976 S.C. Act was identical to the
Model State Act in this regard.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) and (2) (Supp. 1975).
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-140(a)(1) to -140(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
15. Id. § 1-23-20.
16. Id. § 1-23-90.
17. Id. § 1-23-10(2). Compare this section with § 1(1) of the 1976 Act. The earlier
version also included agency orders, rules, certificates, codes of fair competition, and
licenses within the definition of "document." The reason for the change may be twofold.
First, under the 1977 Act, these types of agency pronouncements are more pertinent to
the adjudicatory procedures of article II. Second, in the new Act, the General Assembly
may have desired to reduce the number and kind of agency pronouncements subject to
the formal filing and consideration procedures of article I.
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-10(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The term "regulation" is further
defined to include "the amendment or repeal of a prior regulation," but the legislature
restricted the scope of the term by excepting a number of kinds of agency pronouncements.
1979]
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"regulation" is crucial to the procedures provided in the Act. As
a starting point for determining whether the regulation-making
provisions of article I are applicable, state agencies and practi-
tioners should examine agency pronouncements in light of the
meaning of these two key terms.
Another important preliminary question on coverage of the
the Act's regulation-making provisions is which governmental
entities are required to promulgate and file documents in compli-
ance with article I. The simple answer to this question is: all
"state agencies." That term means "each state board, commis-
sion, departient, executive department or officer, other than the
legislature or the courts, authorized by law to make regulations
or to determine contested cases."' 9
This definition is taken almost verbatim from the Model
State Act,"0 and, as the Commissioners' Comment to the Model
Act points out,' is intended to be all inclusive. The South Caro-
lina Act, however, retreats from all-inclusive coverage by narrow-
ing the scope of the term regulation, which exempts a number of
state agency statements from the regulation-making provisions of
the Act.22 The meaning of the term agency has been the subject
of substantial litigation2s in other states that have adopted simi-
lar state administrative procedure acts.2 Because of the multi-
tude of state governmental entities in this state, and the wide
variety of their pronouncements, litigation in South Carolina dis-
puting the interpretation of the terms "agency," "regulation,"
and "document" is likely. 2s
Id. The intent apparently was to cut back on the breadth of the 1976 Act, as well as to
make agency actions relating only to specified individuals subject only to the procedural
protections of article II. For example, the legislature apparently did not intend for rateset-
ting decisions of the Public Service Commission or price-fixing orders of the Dairy Com-
mission to be subject to the regulation-making procedures of article I, but the administra-
tive procedures of article II apply to these agency functions.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-10(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
20. MODEL STATE ACr § I(1).
21. Id.
23. See, e.g., Smith v. Gunn, 263 La. 599, 268 So. 2d 670 (1972); Riggins v. Housing
Auth. of Seattle, 87 Wash. 2d 97, 549 P.2d 480 (1976); Pritchard v. State, 87 Wyo. 2d 97,
540 P.2d 523 (1976). In determining whether the administrative procedure act should
apply, a principle evident from these cases is that the focus should be on the precise
function performed by the entity.
24. At least 28 jurisdictions, including South Carolina, have adopted versions of the
Model State Act. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, MODEL STATE ACT.
25. See, e.g., 1977 Op. S.C. ATT'Y GEN. 96, advising that the S.C. State Employee
Grievance Committee is a "state agency" within the meaning of the 1976 Act. Noninclu-
sion of the word "committee" in the definition of "agency" is immaterial, because the
[Vol. 30
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A state agency whose pronouncements are subject to the for-
mal regulation-making procedures of the Act must follow the
Act's public notice requirements set forth in article I, sections 11
and 17.8 These sections apply at the initiation of the regulation-
making process and must be construed together because of their
overlapping requirements and terminological disparity. Section
11 expressly applies only to the promulgation of regulations, and
section 17 applies "to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any
rule," 28 a term that is not defined in article I of the 1977 Act.
To further complicate the construction of these sections, section
17(c) states that its provisions are inapplicable to an agency that
has a different and specific regulation-making procedure pre-
scribed by separate statutes. Of the two sections, section 11 is the
more basic, because it applies to all state agency regulation-
making, and section 17 applies when an agency does not have
name of the body is not the controlling factor. Id. This also seems to be a correct interpre-
tation under the 1977 Act.
See also Informal Opinion of Asst. Atty. Gen. Woodington (March 11, 1977) to the
State Development Board, advising that in extending the jurisdiction of a regional housing
authority the Board must comply with the regulation-making provisions of the 1976 Act.
The Board is a "state agency," and its action in extending the territorial jurisdiction of a
city housing authority is in the form of a written document that has general applicability
and legal effect. Id. The result would probably be the same under the 1977 Act, if it is
broadly construed. But compare this with 1976 Op. S.C. ATr'y GEN. 4505, advising that
the State Board of Education is an "agency" under the 1976 Act and that the Board's
"South Carolina State Plan," required as a prerequisite to receipt of federal funds, must
be prepared in compliance with the regulation-making provisions of the 1976 Act. The
result might be different under the 1977 Act because of the narrower scope of the term
"regulation" and because the 1977 Act deleted from the list of documents required to be
filed with the Legislative Council the phrase "policy statements" relating to state agency
expenditures of federal funds. No. 671, § 5(3), 1976 S.C. Acts 1758 (repealed 1977).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-110, -170 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
27. Id. § 1-23-110. This section was a new addition in the 1977 Act, although some of
its language is similar to that of § 12 of the 1976 Act.
28. Id. § 1-23-170(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Section 17 of the 1977 Act is apparently
based on § 3 of the Model State Act.
29. This is one of the potentially serious ambiguities in the terminology of article I.
The term "rule," rather than "regulation," was used almost exclusively in the 1976 Act,
in keeping with the Model State Act's terminology. In the 1977 re-enactment of the South
Carolina Act, the General Assembly omitted "rule" from the list of terms defined in article
I of the Act and may have intended to substitute the term "regulation," giving that term
a narrower meaning than the term "rule" carried in the 1976 Act. The legislature, how-
ever, apparently failed to effect a complete substitution, with the result that §§ 14, 17,
18, 19, and 20 (all of which closely parallel the Model State Act) use the term "rule,"
rather than "regulation." A logical assumption is that the General Assembly intended for
the two terms to carry identical meanings when used in article I, but the term "rule" also
has a distinctly different meaning in article II of the Act dealing with contested cases. See
notes 65-67 and accompanying text infra.
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notice and public participation requirements set out in statutes
specifically applicable to it.
The purpose of the notice requirements in sections 11 and 17
of the Act is to ensure that interested persons are given sufficient
advance notice of proposed agency regulation-making so that
they can participate in the process. 0 A conjunctive reading of
sections 11 and 17 shows that three methods of notice are gener-
ally required. First, the agency must file with the Legislative
Council a notice of a proposed regulation. The proposed regula-
tion must then be published in the State Register at least two
weeks prior to promulgation of the regulation, unless all persons
who will be subject to the regulation are personally served or have
actual notice. The notice in the Register must specify when and
where the public hearing for consideration of the proposed regula-
tion will occur, the statutes that provide the legal authorty for the
proposed regulation, and either the provisions of the proposed
regulation or a synopsis of it. Second, the agency must also give
notice in two newspapers of general circulation in the State at
least thirty days prior to adoption of the regulation. The newspa-
per notice must state the time and place of the public hearing and
must include a statement of either the terms or substance of the
intended action or a description of the subjects and issues in-
volved. Third, the agency must mail notice to all persons who
have made timely requests for advance notice of its regulation-
making proceedings. The exclusion contained in section 17(c)
eliminates the newspaper and personal mailing forms of notice for
state agencies which have different notice and public input re-
quirements specifically prescribed by statute. Publication in the
State Register, however, applies to all state agency regulation-
making.
These notice provisions are comparable to those in section 4
of the Federal Act that requires appropriate notice of proposed
regulation-making to be published in the Federal Register.3' The
1977 South Carolina Act is narrower in scope than the Model
State Act, which requires notice before promulgation of
"interpretative rules, general statements of policy, [and] rules
of agency organization, procedure or practice. '3 2 These pro-
30. See Commissioners' Comment, MODEL STATE AcT § 3.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
32. MODEL STATE AcT § 3(a) uses the term "rule," as broadly defined in § 1(7) of the
Model State Act, to include interpretative rules, policy statements, and rules of proce-
dure. The Federal Act ( § 4(a)) expressly excluded these types of regulation-making from
[Vol. 30
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nouncements are not rules or regulations as defined in the Act,
though, and are not subject to formal regulation-making proce-
dures.
One purpose of requiring advance notice of agency
regulation-making is to allow interested members of the public
sufficient time to prepare and submit information and recom-
mendations concerning proposed rules. Sections 11 and 17 of the
1977 Act further protect the privilege of public input by guar-
anteeing interested persons at least a limited opportunity to be
heard by the agency proposing regulations. Again, as with the
matter of notice, the two sections should be read together to
ascertain the procedures governing public participation.
Section 11(c) of the Act prescribes the public input require-
ments that apply to all state agency regulation promulgations.
The section generally requires the promulgating agency to "give
interested persons an opportunity to be heard through submission
of written data, views or arguments with or without opportunity
for oral presentation."
Section 17, which does not apply to agencies that have
regulation-making procedures prescribed in statutes other than
the Act, has more rigorous, specific requirements. An opportunity
for oral hearing must be granted if requested by twenty-five per-
sons, an association having at least twenty-five members, or a
governmental subdivision or agency. The promulgating agency
must consider all written and oral submissions on the proposed
regulation. After a regulation has been adopted by the agency, if
any interested person has previously requested, or does so within
thirty days, the agency must concisely state the principal reasons
for and against adoption of the regulation and incorporate its
reasons for overruling objections to the regulation.
When article I, section 17 is applied to agency regulation-
making, the promulgating agency must adhere substantially to
its notice and public participation requirements for the regula-
tion to be valid. If a proceeding to contest a promulgation is
brought within two years from the effective date of a regulation,
the courts may invalidate the regulation if it was not adopted in
its notice and hearing requirements. The 1976 South Carolina Act ( § 12b(l)) followed the
lead of the Federal Act. The 1977 Act probably achieves the same result, not by expressly
excluding these types of regulation-making (indeed, they are not mentioned in the 1977
Act), but rather through its more restrictive definition of the term "regulation" in article
I, § 1(4). This assumes that the General Assembly did in fact mean to use the terms "rule"
and "regulation" interchangeably in article I of the 1977 Act.
1979]
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"substantial compliance" with the requirements of article I, sec-
tion 7 of the Act.13 Section 11 of the article I does not contain
an express sanction, nor does it impose a time limit on a suit
contesting the validity of a regulation for failure to comply with
the section's notice and public input requirements.1
An important facet of the Act not found in either the Federal
Act or the Model State Act is the requirement of General Assem-
bly approval of agency regulations before they can become effec-
tive. The Act essentially gives the state legislature power to re-
view and veto any agency regulation by affirmative action within
ninety days after promulgation 3 The agency initiates the process
of legislative review by filing a copy of a promulgated regulation
and a request for review with the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House. They submit the request to the standing
committees of the Senate and House that are concerned with the
function of the promulgating agency. A regulation may become
effective in two ways. First, if within ninety days of its filing, the
General Assembly approves the regulation by joint resolution, it
becomes effective as soon as it is published in the State Register.
Second, if the legislature takes no action on it, the regulation
automatically becomes effective after ninety days. The regulation
is voided only if the General Assembly disapproves the regulation
by joint resolution within ninety days of its filing. 6
If a state agency finds that "an imminent peril to the public
health, safety or welfare requires immediate promulgation of an
emergency regulation," it can, under article I, section 13 of the
33. The requirement of "substantial compliance" is sufficiently indefinite to give the
courts opportunity to uphold agency regulation-making procedures that may vary from
the § 17 guidelines, so long as the procedures are basically fair. See, e.g., Hotel Ass'n of
Washington, D.C. v. District of Columbia Minimum Wage and Indus. Safety Bd., 318
A2d 294 (D.C. App. 1974). But compare that case with Junghans v. Dep't of Human
Resources, 289 A.2d 17 (D.C. App. 1972), and Adams v. Professional Practices Comm'n,
524 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1974).
34. The implications of these differences between article I, §§ 11 and 17 are open to
speculation and may need clarification by the courts or General Assembly. The state
supreme court might read a "substantial compliance" requirement into § 11, like that
expressly stated in § 17. Because § 11 is the more basic of the two sections, is applicable
to the promulgation of all agency regulations, and is already fairly general in its language,
the § 11 requirements should arguably be strictly applied to ensure basic fairness in the
regulation-making process. In other words, § 11 arguably sets out the minimum that
should be required, and failure to meet its requirements should invalidate a particular
regulation promulgated under a deficient procedure.
35. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-23-120 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
36. Sine die adjournment of the General Assembly tolls the running of the ninety day
period for review. Id.
[Vol. 30
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Act, avoid the usual regulation-making procedures and exert its
delegated authority immediately.37 For an emergency regulation
to become effective, only filing in the office of the Legislative
Council is required, along with a statement of the need for imme-
diate promulgation. The emergency regulation becomes effective
at the time of filing, is valid for a maximum of ninety days if
promulgated while the General Assembly is in session, and is not
renewable.
Should an emergency situation arise while the legislature is
not in session, the promulgating agency must, prior to promulga-
tion, give a minimum of one week's notice by publication of a
notice of promulgation in two newspapers of general circulation
in the state. In this situation, a regulation is valid for ninety days
and may be renewed if the General Assembly is not in regular
session at the end of the ninety-day period.38 Emergency regula-
tions can be made permanent by complying with the normal
regulation-making procedures.
The acts of filing with the Legislative Council and publica-
tion in the Register carry legal significance for any person affected
by an agency regulation. First, except for emergency regula-
tions,4" until a regulation is filed, published, and furnished by the
Legislative Council and the promulgating agency for public
inspection," it is not valid against any person lacking actual no-
tice of it. Second, the publication of a document filed with the
Legislative Council creates a rebuttable presumption: (1) that it
was properly "promulgated subject to further action required
under this article; 42 (2) that it was filed and made available for
37. Id. § 1-23-130.
38. Id. § 1-23-120. To understand the procedures governing promulgation of emer-
gency regulations, article I, §§ 12 and 13 should be read together. Section 13 provides the
authority for the promulgation, and § 12 governs legislative review. Apparently the Gen-
eral Assembly felt that it could serve as a check on the use of emergency regulation-
making authority by state agencies so long as the legislature was in session; hence, the
one week advance notice and newspaper publication are not required when the legislature
is in session. See generally, MODEL STATE AcT §§ 3-4; 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (d)(3) (1970)
for comparable emergency provisions.
39. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-60 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
40. Id. § 1-23-130.
41. Id. § 1-23-30. This requires the Legislative Council to make filed documents
available for public inspection. Agencies are required to make regulations, orders, and
decisions available for public inspection if they are to be valid. Id. § 1-23-140.
42. Id. § 1-23-60(1). Why this phrase, not in the 1976 Act (see § 7(1) of the 1976 Act)
was added is unclear. Perhaps the language refers to General Assembly approval, but §
4(1) of the 1977 Act (§ 1-23-40(1)) directs that final regulations be published in the State
Register only after General Assembly approval. Thus, if the presumption is not meant to
1979]
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public inspection at the time noted on the face of the regulation;
and (3) that the copy on file with the Legislative Council is a true
copy of the original. Third, courts are required to notice judicially
the contents of filed documents. 3
An objective of the Act is to make state agencies more acces-
sible and responsive to the public. To further this objective, arti-
cle I, section 18 of the Act" allows any interested person to peti-
tion an agency for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a
regulation. Each agency must adopt a formal regulation that tells
the public how to petition the agency for this action. The Act also
requires the agency, within thirty days either to deny the petition
in writing, stating the reasons, or to initiate the normal
regulation-making procedures.
The Act also provides several different ways in which persons
adversely affected, or likely to be adversely affected, by agency
regulations can seek relief from the agency and in the courts.
First, article I, section 1511 requires each agency to establish by
regulation a procedure under which any aggrieved party can con-
test the authority of the agency to promulgate a particular regula-
tion. This procedure operates before the act of final promulga-
tion, and it must comply with the provisions of article II of the
Act governing administrative adjudications; in other words, it
operates like the procedures for handling a contested case. In
addition to this administrative remedy, section 15 allows an ag-
grieved person, after final promulgation of a regulation, to go to
the circuit court and petition for injunctive relief on the grounds
that the regulation exceeds the regulatory authority of the pro-
mulgating agency.46
encompass the fact of General Assembly approval, perhaps it should, since final regula-
tions are not to be published until such approval occurs. In any event, practitioners who
wish to attack an agency regulation should be aware of this section and be prepared to
carry the burden of proof.
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-60 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
44. Id. § 1-23-180. This section of the 1977 S.C. Act is identical to § 15 of the 1976
S.C. Act and § 6 of the Model State Act. Section 4(d) of the Federal Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)
(1970), is similar.
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-150 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The origin of this particular
section is puzzling, for there is no comparable provision in the 1976 Act, the Model State
Act, or the Federal Act.
46. The administrative remedy in § 15 should be particularly useful, because it allows
persons who might be affected by a proposed regulation to contest the agency's authority
to adopt the regulation prior to the regulation's being finalized. The injunctive relief
provision, however, seems to duplicate the declaratory judgment remedy in § 19, because
for a regulation to be valid, the agency must have acted within its statutory authority,
and either a declaratory judgment of invalidity or an injunction would have the effect of
[Vol. 30
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Second, article I, section 20 of the Act47 gives any person who
may be affected by an agency regulation the right to petition the
agency for a declaratory ruling on "the applicability of any statu-
tory provision or of any rule or order of the agency."4 As under
section 15, the agency's ruling has the same status as an agency
decision in a contested case so that the provisions of article II
apply."
Third, article I, section 1911 allows any aggrieved person,
upon proper allegation of injury or threatened injury, to petition
a circuit court for a declaratory judgment regarding the validity
or applicability of a particular agency regulation. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required, and a declaratory judg-
ment may be rendered regardless of whether the plaintiff has first
asked the agency to pass upon the validity or applicability of the
regulation in question." The Act imposes no statute of limitations
on any of these remedies, but a proceeding to contest any regula-
tion on the ground of noncompliance with the procedural require-
ments of section 17 must be initiated within two years from the
effective date of the regulation.
halting agency enforcement of the particular regulation. Section 15 also leaves open the
question of whether a person who disagrees with an agency decision regarding its authority
to promulgate a regulation must wait until after the regulation has been finally promul-
gated before taking the issue of agency authority to the courts. Clearly, the injunctive
relief cannot be had in court until after final promulgation, but the language of the section
does not expressly preclude a direct appeal from an agency decision in accordance with
article 11 of the Act.
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-200 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The section is identical to § 8 of
the Model State Act and similar to § 5(d) of the Federal Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1970).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-200 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The section also requires that the
agency adopt as a formal regulation the procedure for handling petitions for declaratory
rulings. There is some case law, however, to the effect that the rendering of such declara-
tory rulings is within the discretion of the agency. See, e.g., Wisconsin Fertilizer Ass'n v.
Kains, 39 Wis. 2d 95, 158 N.W.2d 294 (1968). By its express language, the comparable
provision in the Federal Act is discretionary.
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-200 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
50. Id. § 1-23-190. The section is identical to § 7 of the Model State Act. As stated
in the Commissioners' Comment to § 7 of the Model State Act, there is no comparable
provision in the Federal Act, because regulation-making is reviewable under the provisions
of that Act dealing with judicial review of administrative orders.
51. Interesting questions may arise regarding the appropriate scope of judicial review
under § 19. Article I of the Act says nothing about scope of review, and whether the
General Assembly intended for the courts to look to the provisions of article II, § 380 as
the proper standards is unclear. Decisions by courts in other states that have adopted a
version of the Model State Act may provide some guidance. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v.
Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 37 Ill. App. 3d 264, 346 N.E.2d 212 (1976), HM Distributors
of Milwaukee, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 55 Wis. 2d 261, 198 N.W.2d 598 (1972).
11
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C. Administrative Adjudications
Prior to January 1, 1977,52 no uniform procedures for admin-
istrative adjudications applied to every state agency in South
Carolina. Only the general contours of procedural due process and
any additional requirements imposed by statute on particular
agency determinations, or voluntarily adopted by the agency,
governed the decision-making process in individual contested
cases, such as licensing, price- and rate-fixing, and other agency
orders. The Act radically changes the law covering state agency
administrative adjudications in South Carolina and provides uni-
form procedural protections covering all state agencies.1
3
The second substantive article in the Act deals with adminis-
trative procedures in individual contested cases. As with article I
of the Act, the key terms define the scope of the provisions. The
term "contested case" is defined as "a proceeding, including but
not restricted to rate making, price fixing, and licensing, in which
the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law
to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hear-
ing." This definition is identical to that in the Model State Act,
which uses the term "contested case" in lieu of the Federal Act's
term "adjudication." 55 Significantly, South Carolina includes
price-fixing hearings within the scope of contested cases, whereas
the Model State Act makes inclusion of these proceedings op-
tional."
As might be expected, the scope of the term contested case
has spawned much litigation in other states that have enacted
52. The effective date of the 1976 Act was January 1, 1977. No. 671, § 27, 1976 S.C.
Acts 1758. The 1977 Act, however, repealed the 1976 Act, and its provisions governing
administrative adjudications apply only to matters initiated after June 13, 1977. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-23-400 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
53. But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-400 (Cum. Supp. 1977), which makes the provi-
sions governing ex parte communications by agency personnel ( § 1-23-360) and licensing
( § 1-23-370) inapplicable "to any agency which under existing statutes has established
and follows notice and hearing procedures which are in compliance with such sections."
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
55. Compare MODEL STATE AcT § 1(2) with the Federal Act § 2(d), 5 U.S.C. § 551(7)
(1970). As explained in the Commissioners' Comment to § 1 of the Model State Act, the
change in terminology was made to avoid possible confusion from classification of rate-
making under the Federal Act as regulation-making, with the regulation-making proce-
dures applicable to it; however, under the Model State Act, the provisions for contested
cases govern ratemaking.
56. The significance of this action by the General Assembly is that price-fixing activi-
ties of the South Carolina Dairy Commission are probably brought within the coverage of
the Act, because under S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-33-410 and -1030 (1976), the Commission
must hold a public hearing prior to the establishment of minimum milk sale prices.
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similar administrative procedure statutes.57 Analysis of state su-
peme court decisions on this issue reveals that at least two key
elements must be present before a state agency administrative
proceeding becomes a contested case: (1) a hearing must be re-
quired by law,5 and (2) the proceeding must adversely affect the
"special" legal interests of a particular person or persons"g as
opposed to the general public interest. 0 In most contested cases,
distinctly opposing parties are present, and the agency hearing
takes on the character of a civil, trial-like proceeding.
Another key term affecting the scope of article I of the Act
is "agency," defined in article II, section 1(1) to mean "each State
board, commission, department or officer, other than the legisla-
ture or the courts, authorized by law to make rules or to deter-
mine contested cases."61 This definition is virtually identical to
the definition of "agency" or "state agency" in article I, section
1(1). The only difference between the two is that article I inserted
the word "executive" before "department" and substituted the
57. See, e.g., Local 1344, Am. Fed. of State, County and Municipal Employees v.
Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations, 30 Conn. Supp. 259, 309 A.2d 696 (1973) (Bd.
decision affecting union rights is a contested case); Quick v. Department of Motor Vehi-
cles, 331 A.2d 319 (D.C. App. 1975) (driver's license revocation proceeding is a contested
case); Rose Lees Hardy Home and School Ass'n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning
Adjustment, 324 A.2d 701 (D.C. App. 1974) (zoning variance proceeding is a contested
case); Capitol Hill Restoration Soc'y v. Zoning Comm'r, 287 A.2d 101 (D.C. App. 1972)
(proceeding for approval of planned unit development is a contested case); Frazee v. Iowa
Bd. of Parole, - Iowa -, 248 N.W.2d 80 (1976) (parole revocation proceeding is a
contested case); State ex rel. R.R. v. Schmidt, 63 Wis. 2d 82, 216 N.W.2d 18 (1974)
(revocation of juvenile's "after care" supervision not a contested case); Gleason v. Wiscon-
sin Dep't of Transp., 61 Wis. 2d 562, 213 N.W.2d 74 (1973) (driver's license revocation
proceeding not a contested case).
58. The hearing referred to in the definition of "contested case" has generally been
interpreted to mean a formal, trial-type hearing, rather than an informal conference. See,
e.g., McAuliffe v. Carlson, 30 Conn. Supp. 118, 303 A.2d 746 (1973); Chevy Chase Citizens
Ass'n v. District of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310 (D.C. App. 1974); Daly v. Natural
Resources Bd., 60 Wis. 2d 208, 208 N.W.2d 839 (1973), cert. den., 414 U.S. 1137 (1974);
1978 Op. S.C. ATr'Y GEN. - (advising that formal employee grievance hearings, if
required by agency regulations or statute, are contested case proceedings within the cover-
age of the Act).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
60. If the agency function is "quasi-legislative" in character, directed toward an
agency decision having general public applicability, the proceeding most likely will be
governed by the regulation-making provisions of article I of the Act, rather than the
contested case provisions of article II. See, e.g., Ruppert v. Washington, 366 F. Supp. 686
(D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 534 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Mayor Commissioner of D.C., 317 A.2d 515 (D.C. App. 1974); State ex rel. City of La
Crosse v. Rothwell, 25 Wis. 2d 228, 130 N.W.2d 806 (1964), rehearing denied, 25 Wis. 2d
228, 131 N.W.2d 699 (1964).
61. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-23-310(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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term "regulation" in lieu of the term "rule." The first difference
is insignificant, but the latter is crucial, because the term "rule"
is used in article II of the Act to mean something different from
the term "regulation" as used in article I, in which the terms
"rule" and "regulation" were apparently employed interchange-
ably. 2
As used in article HI of the Act the term "agency" includes
all state agencies that render decisions in contested cases. Hence,
the General Assembly apparently followed the suggestion of the
Model State Act and, unlike some state legislatures, chose not to
exempt certain state agencies from the coverage of the adminis-
trative adjudications provisions of the Act. Nor did the General
Assembly curtail the scope of article II, as it did in article I of the
Act, by limiting the definition of other key terms, such as the
term "rule." On the other hand, the legislative body did not, as
some states have done, broaden the scope of the term "agency"
to include certain city, county or regional administrative entities,
which may have substantial powers over persons and property."3
Occasion may arise, however, for litigation over the issue of ex-
actly what constitutes an "agency" within the meaning of article
II. In resolving these questions, other state courts have empha-
sized that the function performed by the entity, rather than offi-
cial positions held by individual members, is determinative. 4
Section 1(6) of article II defines "rule" as "each final agency
statement, decision or order in a contested case. The term in-
cludes the amendment or repeal of a prior rule, but does not
include statements concerning only the internal management of
any agency and not affecting private rights or procedures avail-
able to the public."' 5 This definition, like several others employed
in the Act, can best be described as a confusing hodgepodge of
concepts, taken in part from the Model State Act,6 with some
apparently original additions by the General Assembly. The es-
sence of the definition is that a "rule" when referred to in article
II, is the final decision of a state agency in a contested case or a
reversal or modification of such a decision. A "rule," then, equals
an "order," as that term is employed in the Federal Act. 7
62. See note 29, supra.
63. Commissioners' Comment, MODEL STATE AcT § 1 (Supp. 1978).
64. See, e.g., Riggins v. Housing Auth. of Seattle, 87 Wash. 2d 97, 549 P.2d 480
(1976); State v. Board of Valuation 72 Wash. 2d 66, 431 P.2d 715 (1967).
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
66. MODEL STATE ACT § 1(7).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1970).
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An objective of the Act is to ensure that decisions in con-
tested cases be based on evidence considered at a hearing. Article
I, section 2 thus mandates that all parties be afforded an oppor-
tunity for a hearing after notice of no fewer than thirty days." The
notice must adequately inform the parties of the time and place
of the hearing, the legal authority under which the agency is
exercising its power, the particular statutes or rules involved, and
a brief statement of the matters asserted, or at least the issues
involved.
Two significant provisions of the Act that are not part of the
Model State Act are the right of any party to the proceedings to
depose witnesses, and the right of any agency, acting for itself
or on behalf of another party, to issue enforceable subpoenas to
compel the testimony of witnesses at the hearing and to compel
the production of other relevant evidence. Under article II, sec-
tion 2(c), any party to the proceeding can depose "witnesses
within or without the State and, either by commission or de bene
esse."' The rules governing the taking of depositions in civil ac-
tions apply. Under article II, section 2(d), the agency can issue
subpoenas on its own motion or at the request of any other party.7
Upon proper application the circuit court can use its contempt
power, if necessary, to enforce subpoenas. The agency is also
empowered to issue to the sheriff of the county where the hearing
is held a warrant requiring the sheriff to produce any witness who
refuses to honor an agency subpoena; but the agency must excuse
any witness from appearing on the same grounds that witnesses
or jurors are excused from appearing in the state courts.7'
In conducting a contested case hearing, article II, section 2
requires the agency to afford all parties an opportunity to respond
to and present evidence and argument on all issues involved. The
section also allows informal disposition of any contested case by
stipulation, settlement, consent order, or default. The statute
dictates exactly what must be included in the record of a con-
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-320 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Section 9 of the Model State Act,
on which this section of the 1977 S.C. Act is based, was less specific in the timing of the
notice, requiring only "reasonable notice" of the hearing. Section 5(a) of the Federal Act,
5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1970), requires that persons entitled to notice be "timely informed."
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-320(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
70. Id. § 1-23-320(d).
71. Id. Compare, 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1970) (the Federal Act does not authorize a
federal agency to issue warrants to a U.S. Marshall requiring him to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses. Bypassing the courts in such a procedure may raise due process
questions.).
19791
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tested case. Finally, article II, section 2 provides for transcribing
oral proceedings in a contested case upon request of any party.
The section also says that findings of fact must be based exclu-
sively on the evidence and matters officially noticed.
A matter that is not covered in the contested case provisions
of the Act, nor in the Model State Act, is the right of a party to
be represented by legal counsel or other qualified representative
at the hearing. Section 6(a) of the Federal Act explicitly states
that a person compelled to appear before an agency can be
"accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel or, if permit-
ted by the agency, by other qualified representative. 17 2 The Act's
silence on this subject should not be interpreted as a denial of the
right to have legal representation in a contested case hearing,
because the aim of this portion of the Act is to ensure due process
and fundamental fairness to all parties affected by agency orders
in contested cases.
Article III, section 3 of the Act" provides that the rules of
evidence, privilege, cross-examination, and judicial notice appli-
cable in civil court cases must be followed in agency hearings on
contested cases. Any evidence can be received in written form to
expedite the hearing, provided that this procedure does not sub-
stantially prejudice the interests of the parties. Copies of docu-
mentary evidence are acceptable if the original is unavailable.
The agency may notice not only judicially cognizable facts, but
also generally recognized technical or scientific facts within its
specialized knowledge, and staff memoranda or data. Parties to
the hearing must be told beforehand or during the hearing of all
material noticed and given an opportunity to contest it. In evalu-
ating the evidence, the agency may utilize its experience and
expertise in the subject area.
The effect of this section of the Act is to make the standards
of proof in contested cases before state agencies substantially
equivalent to those applicable in the courts. Significantly, the
Act goes further than the Model State Act, which contains an
"escape clause" in cases of hardship.74 This clause permits the
introduction of some evidence that, while relevant and probative,
would be inadmissible under the normal rules of evidence.
A major goal of the Act is to ensure that agency officials who
make the final decisions in contested cases be personally familiar
72. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970).
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-330 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
74. MODEL STATE Acr § 10(I).
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with the issues and evidence. To effectuate this goal, article II,
section 475 requires that if those rendering the final decision have
not heard the case or reviewed the record and if the decision is
adverse to a nonagency party to the proceeding, a proposal for
decision must be served upon the parties. This proposal must
contain a statement, prepared by the hearing officer or one who
has read the record, justifying the decision and stating each issue
of fact or law that forms the basis for the decision. Parties ad-
versely affected by the proposed decision must be given an oppor-
tunity to file exceptions and present briefs and oral arguments to
the agency officials who will make the final decision. By written
stipulation of the parties, however, compliance with this section
may be waived.
Once an agency reaches a final decision in a contested case,
article II, section 576 requires that it be stated in writing, if ad-
verse to one of the parties. The parties must be notified of the
decision either personally or by mail. This section of the Act also
requires the final decision to include separately stated findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Factual findings merely recapitulat-
ing statutory langauge are insufficient; the section requires a con-
cise, explicit statement of the basic underlying facts supporting
the decision and a ruling on each proposed finding of fact if these
proposals were submitted to the agency.
This statement of the underlying facts supporting the deci-
sion is important for two reasons. First, it explains to the parties
the basis for the decision. Second, if a party to whom the decision
is adverse later seeks judicial review, the reviewing court will be
in a better position to know the facts on which the agency relied
and the degree to which the record supports the agency decision.
The statement of findings becomes particularly important in
cases such as licensing, in which another statute vests a large
measure of discretion in the agency. 7 Reviewing courts have fre-
quently expressed great displeasure with agencies that do not
adequately support their decisions or treat the requirement as a
mere technicality, and they have not hesitated to reverse the
decision, or at least remand for a proper justification." Case law
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-340 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Identical to § 11 of the MODEL
STATE AcT, and similar to § 8(a) of the Federal Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b), (c) (1970).
76. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-350 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Identical to § 12 of the MODEL
STATE Acr and similar to § 8(b) of the Federal Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970).
77. See Village Brooks, Inc. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals and Review, 296
A.2d 613 (D.C. App. 1972).
78. See, e.g., id.; Luther v. Board of Educ. of Alpena and Presque Isle Counties, 62
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also reveals that the courts are reluctant to draw inferences from
findings not actually made by the agency or to allow the agency
to support its decision on appeal with reasons not relied on at the
administrative level. 9
To avoid unfair influence on agency officials involved in de-
ciding contested cases, article II, section 6 of the Act'" precludes
ex parte consultations with any person, party, or his representa-
tive, unless all parties are notified and given an opportunity to
participate. Discussion of the case among members of the agency
is not prohibited, though. The Act adds a penalty provision mak-
ing it a misdemeanor to violate these prohibitions, but also pro-
vides in article II, section 101 that the provisions of section 6 are
inapplicable to any agency that, under existing statutes, has es-
tablished and follows substantially similar notice and hearing
procedures. The purposes of section 6 are to prevent litigious facts
from reaching those making the decision without becoming part
of the hearing record and to preclude ex parte discussion of the
law with a party or his representative. 8 If strictly enforced, this
part of the Act may alter traditional methods of operation in some
types of administrative adjudications. Furthermore, a definite
trade-off is involved, because the gain in prevention of improper
influence must be balanced against the loss in flexibility and
practicality afforded by informal, ex parte discussion.
Article II, section 7 of the Act 3 expressly brings licensing
decisions under the umbrella of contested cases whenever a stat-
ute requires that the grant, denial, or renewal of a license be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing. If renewal of an
existing license is involved, and timely application for renewal is
made, the Act provides that the existing license will remain valid
until the agency renders its decision. Furthermore, if the renewal
is denied or the new license limited, the old license is valid until
the last day for seeking court review, or a later date fixed by order
Mich. App. 32; 233 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1975); Brown v. Banking Bd., 512 P.2d 166
(Okla. 1973); Citizens Bank of Weirton v. West Virginia Bd. of Banking and Financial
Institutions, _W. Va. -, 233 S.E.2d 719 (1977).
79. Mahelona v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 418 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Hawaii 1976); Dietrich
v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 293 A.2d 470 (D.C. App. 1972).
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-360 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Based on § 13 of the MODEL STATE
AcT and related to § 5(c) of the Federal Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970).
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-400 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
82. Commissioners' Comment, MODEL STATE ACr § 13.
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-370 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Identical to § 14 of the MODEL
STATE AcT and similar to § 9(b) of the Federal Act, 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1970).
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of the reviewing court. Unless the public health, safety or welfare
requires emergency action, agencies cannot terminate a license
without notifying the licensee and giving him a chance to demon-
strate compliance. If an emergency exists the agency can simply
state the necessity for its action and summarily suspend the li-
cense pending prompt institution of proceedingss for revocation.
Under article II, section 10,4 the provisions of section 7 are not
applicable to agencies that have substantially similar notice and
hearing procedures for licensing set forth in separate statutes.
To give an opportunity to correct a possibly erroneous agency
decision to persons aggrieved by final decisions of administrative
agencies in contested cases, article II, section 8 of the Act 5 pro-
vides for judicial review by the state circuit courts. The method
of obtaining court review and the scope of that review are similar,
but not identical, to those available under the Federal Act."6 The
doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and ripeness
apply, but the Act states that a preliminary, procedural, or inter-
mediate agency ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the
final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. The
Act does not repeal other review provisions on the statute books;
thus, section 8 is not meant to be the exclusive remedy to a person
aggrieved by agency action if other methods of court review or
trial de novo are provided by statutes governing the particular
agency that rendered the disputed decision.
Aggrieved persons have thirty days after a final agency deci-
sion to petition the circuit court for review, but if an agency
rehearing is requested, the thirty-day period runs from the time
a decision is made denying the request for rehearing. Enforce-
ment of an agency decision is not automatically stayed by filing
for court review. Rather, granting a stay is discretionary with the
agency or the reviewing court. The entire record of the agency
hearing is made available for court review, but the parties may
stipulate to shortening it. If a party refuses unreasonably to stipu-
late to limiting the record, the court may tax the party for the
additional cost. Upon a proper showing, the court may also accept
additional evidence, or it may order that the additional evidence
be taken before the agency, which may modify its findings and
decision.
84. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-400 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
85. Id. § 1-23-380.
86. See 5 U.S.C. H9 701-706 (1970). Art. II, § 8 of the South Carolina Act is identical
to § 15 of the MODEL STATE Acr.
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Generally, the court will confine its review to the record, but
the judge will hear oral argument and receive written briefs if
requested by one of the parties. If it is alleged that irregularities
were present in the agency procedure, and these are not shown
in the record, proof of the irregularities can be made before the
court.
Article II, section 8(g) directs that "[t]he court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact." 8 While the court cannot -act as
another trier of fact, the scope of review in section 8(g) allows it
to
reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appel-
lant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings,
inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Sections 8(g)(1) and (2) pertain to the ultra vires doctrine, which
requires that the agency not go beyond the jurisdictional grant
given it by statutes and the state constitution." Should a state
agency act beyond the authority delegated to it, or fail to follow
the laws applicable to it in reaching a decision in a contested case,
the decision is clearly subject to being reversed by the reviewing
court.
Significantly, section 8(g)(5) employs the "clearly erro-
neous" standard for review of factual findings, rather than the
"substantial evidence" test of the Federal Act. The "clearly
erroneous" standard gives the reviewing court greater leeway to
reverse agency decisions than does the "substantial evidence"
test. Under the latter standard, the reviewing tribunal is obli-
gated to affirm the agency action if, upon viewing the record as a
whole, the result is a logical one and there is "substantial evi-
87. S.C. ConE ANN. § 1-23-380(g)- (Cum. Supp. 1977).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Kahn v. Civil Service Comm'n., 40 Ill. App. 3d 615, 352 N.E.2d 231
(1976).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
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dence" to support it." In contrast, under the "clearly erroneous"
standard, the court not only must consider all the evidence in the
record, but also it must reverse if a clearly superior choice to that
of the agency is indicated. The "clearly erroneous" test has been
described as a firm conviction by the reviewing court, based on
its review of all the evidence, that a mistake was committed by
the agency.
2
In article II, section 8(g)(6) of the Act, the language "clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion" should be interpreted as
meaning the same as arbitrary action.93 If the agency has acted
arbitrarily or abused its discretion in reaching its decision, the
reviewing court should set aside the decision. This test essentially
equals a test of reasonableness and rationality. 4
The scope of review is often crucial. While the Act sets forth
the standards that the reviewing court should follow, the stan-
dards are not overly precise and ample room for judicial discre-
tion in applying these general standards to the facts of a given
case is still present. If a common theme underlies judicial deci-
sions on the issue of the proper scope of review, however, it is that
the actions of administrative agencies must be accorded great
respect and presumed to be correct until shown otherwise by a
challenging party. Perhaps this "bias" is justifiable in a govern-
mental system in which the doctrine of separation of powers is a
tenet. The courts recognize that limited judicial review strength-
ens the administrative process and that judicial economy requires
that administrative agencies be allowed to exercise the various
functions in which they have developed expertise and in which
they are comparatively better qualified than the courts. On the
other hand, court review is necessary as a balancing check on
agency action."
As a further complement to a party's right of judicial review
91. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
92. See, e.g., Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wash. 2d 280, 552 P.2d 1038 (1976); Willard v.
Employment Security Dep't., 10 Wash. App. 437, 517 P.2d 973 (Ct. App. 1974) (discussing
the "clearly erroneous" test); cf. Commissioner, Baltimore City Police Dep't v. Cason,
34 Md. App. 487, 368 A.2d 1067 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co.,
65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1975); Board of Bank Control v. Thomason,
236 S.C. 158, 113 S.E.2d 544 (1960) (discussing the "substantial evidence" test).
93. See Commissioners Comment, MODEL STATE Acr § 15.
94. See, e.g., Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Town of Pleasant Prairie
v. Johnson, 34 Wis. 2d 8, 148 N.W.2d 27 (1967).
95. Vita-Rich Dairy v. Department of Business Regulation, 170 Mont. 341, 553 P.2d
980 (1976).
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of administrative action, article H, section 9 of the Act" provides
as in other civil cases that an aggrieved party may obtain review
of any final judgment of a circuit court by appeal to the supreme
court.
D. Conclusion
The Administrative Procedure Act is new in South Carolina,
although other states have been operating under similar acts for
a number of years. While the Act is yet to be tested bef6re the
state supreme court, challenges should soon appear because of
the many ambiguities and far-reaching provisions in the new law.
The major goals of the Act - bringing greater public input into
agency regulation-making and ensuring fundamental fairness in
administrative adjudications - are certainly laudable. Major
deficiencies, however, are still present in the Act, and many
would undoubtedly consider additional statutory protections de-
sirable. In short, there is still plenty of work for the General
Assembly and for the courts.
II. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
During its fall 1977 term, the South Carolina Supeme Court
decided two cases largely on the doctrine of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. These two cases provide an interesting
contrast between an overly harsh, improper application of the
doctrine and a more appropriate, theoretically sound use of it.
In City of Columbia v. Abbott,9" the court unanimously de-
nied relief to the manager of an adult bookstore who had been
convicted of operating a business without first procuring a city
license. The court found the manager had not taken advantage
of administrative remedies for appealing the denial of the license
before his arrest and conviction.
Defendant-appellant was operating the bookstore under a
valid business license when it requested a change of its license
because it moved to a different location. The City License Inspec-
tor denied the request because he determined the business pur-
pose to be a nuisance and unlawful. The store requested an ap-
peal hearing before the city council, but pending the hearing, it
filed another license application for a third location and withdrew
its earlier appeal. The city inspector denied the alternate applica-
96. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-23-390 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
97, 269 S.C. 504, 238 S.E.2d 177 (1977).
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tion for the same reason as the first, and the store did not appeal.
Instead, the store opened for business at the latter location.
Thereafter, its manager was arrested and convicted for operating
without a business license. He appealed to the circuit court, and
contended that the licensing ordinance98 was unconstitutional
"because it operates as a prior restraint on free speech and press
and because it has a chilling effect on the exercise of rights
granted by the first amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion."9
The City prevailed in the circuit court by arguing that
defendant-appellant was precluded from resort to the court be-
cause he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies upon
denial of the license application. On review, the supreme court
held for the City. The court said that granting a license is an
administrative function so that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies. Because the available adminis-
trative appeals were not utilized, "it follows that no relief will be
granted by the Court."'0 0
While Justice Littlejohn, speaking for the court, added that
the court had also reviewed the constitutional grounds for appeal
and found them meritless, the exhaustion requirement was
clearly the principal basis for the decision. Statements by the
United States Supreme Court and writings by commentators
about the doctrine, however, demonstrate that this was not a
proper instance in which to apply it.
The exhaustion doctrine concerns the timing of judicial re-
view of administrative action. °10 It is most applicable when a
person with additional administrative remedies available seeks to
bypass further administrative consideration by taking his case for
relief directly to the courts. When this situation occurs, courts
usually refuse to hear the controversy until the plaintiff utilizes
the entire administrative process. 02
Abbott does not fit this pattern. Abbott did not attempt
to short-circuit the administrative process by taking his contro-
versy directly to the courts. The City took him to court in a
criminal action in which he was a defendant. Once the case got
98. Columbia, S.C., Ordinance 74-6, §§ 27.1-.2.
99. 269 S.C. at 506, 238 S.E.2d at 178.
100. Id. at 509, 238 S.E.2d at 179.
101. K. DAVIS, ADMNISTRATVE LAW TEXT 382 (3d ed. 1972).
102. Id. See, e.g., Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954) (exhaus-
tion not required); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (ex-
haustion required).
19791
23
Steer: Administrative Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to court, the City's decision on the license application had be-
come final, and no administrative remedies were left for Abbott
to exhaust. Furthermore, the nature of Abbott's defense - that the
city ordinance was unconstitutional - is not a question suited to
administrative determination. Deciding the constitutionality of a
law is a function peculiarly suited to and reserved for the courts.0 3
McKart v. United States '4 is particularly apropos to the
Abbott situation. In that case, the United States Supreme Court
held that a person who took no administrative appeal from a
reclassification by a selective service board and who was con-
victed for failure to report for induction was not barred by the
exhaustion doctrine from having the courts hear his appeal and
determine a question of statutory interpretation. The Court noted
that use of the exhaustion doctrine in a criminal case can be
exceedingly harsh because it deprives the defendant of his only
defense." 5 In Abbott, that was precisely the effect of the South
Carolina Supreme Court's decision. 06
Significantly, the case and commentary law cited by the
court in the Abbott opinion do not support its conclusion. The
court relied on its earlier decision in DePass v. City of
Spartanburg' to support its reasoning; in that case, however, a
plaintiff sued in equity to have the circuit court enjoin the city
from enforcing a substandard housing ordinance against her. The
court properly refused to take jurisdiction at that stage of the
controversy before the plaintiff had availed herself of all adminis-
trative remedies. The supreme court affirmed, noting that plain-
tiff's constitutional rights remained unimpaired pending exhaus-
tion of the administrative proceedings.' In contrast, Abbott had
no available remedies in the administrative process to which he
could return, and his only opportunity to press his constitutional
103. Public Utilities Comm'n. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534,539 (1958). Had Abbott
appealed the denial of the alternate location license to the Columbia City Council, the
Council would probably not have considered his constitutional claim.
104. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
105. Id. at 197.
106. Of course, the court summarily stated that it had examined Abbott'& "other
grounds submitted" and found them without merit. The point is that these "other
grounds" were the heart of Abbott's defense. Furthermore, since his claim was purely a
constitutional one, not involving underlying issues of fact that agency expertise could help
resolve (as in McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971)), there was no good reason for
the court not to resolve these issues of law on their merits (unless they were entirely
frivolous).
107. 234 S.C. 198, 107 S.E.2d 350 (1959).
108. Id.
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claims, before paying a fine or going to jail, was in the undertaken
round of court appeals.
Columbia Developers, Inc. v. Elliott"" was the second 1977
case in which the South Carolina Supreme Court was faced with
an exhaustion of remedies issue. The case arose when the owner
of a multistory building in Columbia paid property taxes under
protest and sought to recover the amount paid."" The taxpayer
had not availed itself of opportunities to have an additional as-
sessment by the county assessor administratively reviewed, nor
had it challenged administratively the Richland County auditor's
later determination that it owed back taxes for the years 1972 and
1973. When the taxpayer paid the additional taxes under protest
and sought recovery in the circuit court, it was denied relief be-
cause it had failed to exhaust first the available administrative
remedies. The circuit court also ruled on the merits that the
taxpayer had no valid claim. The supreme court affirmed in a per
curiam opinion.
In the supreme court, appellant-taxpayer principally relied
on the court's prior decision in Andrews Bearing Corporation v.
Brady, "' in which the court held that the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies was "not an invariable rule," and that
exhaustion was not required when "the facts were undisputed and
the issue involved was solely one of law.""' Observing the factual
context in the case at bar, the court distinguished it from
Andrews Bearing on the ground that the instant case presented
"mixed questions of law and fact."" 3 The court thus affirmed the
lower court's ruling that the taxpayer could not recover because
it had failed to take advantage of available administrative reme-
dies. The court also noted that it believed the trial judge had
"reached a conclusion of which the evidence is susceptible" on
the substantive issues, and thus the court was bound by that
finding."'
Compared to the Abbott decision, the result reached in this
case is more logical and more in keeping with the purposes of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The result is
109. 269 S.C. 486, 238 S.E.2d 169 (1977).
110. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-47-210 to -270 contain the statutory provisions pertaining
to recovery of local taxes paid under protest.
111. 261 S.C. 553, 201 S.E.2d 241 (1973).
112. 269 S.C. 486, 489, 238 S.E.2d 169, 171.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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still a rather harsh one, because the taxpayer was deprived of a
chance to litigate fully before the supreme court his claim that
the county lacked statutory authority to levy in 1974 against
property that escaped taxation in 1972 and 1973 because of the
county's own administrative error. Apparently, however, the sub-
stantive claim was thoroughly aired in the trial court, and the
supreme court believed the lower court's conclusion on the merits
was supported by the evidence.
Other considerations distinguish and justify Columbia
Developers as a correct application of the exhaustion doctrine.
First, it was the taxpayer in Columbia Developers who chose to
take his claim immediately to court rather than have it consid-
ered in the administrative process. In Abbott, the City of Colum-
bia took the defendant to court. Second, Columbia Developers
was a civil case, and Abbott involved the appeal of a criminal
conviction. While invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies
was harsh in both cases, it was exceedingly harsh in Abbott be-
cause it deprived the defendant of his principal defense. Third,
Columbia Developers involved mixed questions of fact and statu-
tory law, and Abbott presented solely questions of constitutional
law. The United States Supreme Court has approved the applica-
tion of the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies in the former kind
of case,' but it has disapproved its use to deny judicial review
in the latter situation."6
In summary, these two decisions show a court that is prone
to invoke the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
at every available opportunity. At least when the denial of busi-
ness licenses or the payment of local property taxes under protest
is at issue, the applicant or taxpayer would be well advised to
exhaust every available administrative remedy before going to
court.
John R. Steer
115. McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971); W.E.B. DuBois Clubs v. Clark,
389 U.S. 309 (1967).
116. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); Public Utilities Comm'n v.
United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
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